Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
ESI Publications

Economic Science Institute

5-30-2019

Commentary: Reflections on Decision Research and Its
Empiricism: Four Comments Inspired by Harrison
Nathaniel T. Wilcox
Chapman University, nwilcox@chapman.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_pubs
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, and the Other Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Wilcox, N. T. (2019). Commentary: Reflections on decision research and its empiricism: Four comments
inspired by Harrison. In M. Nagatsu & A. Ruzzene (Eds.), Contemporary philosophy and social science: An
interdisciplinary dialogue (pp. 139-146). Bloomsbury Academic.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in ESI Publications by an authorized administrator of
Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

Commentary: Reflections on Decision Research and Its Empiricism: Four
Comments Inspired by Harrison
Comments
This book chapter was published in Michiru Nagatsu and Attilia Ruzzene, (Eds.), Contemporary
Philosophy and Social Science: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue. Dr. Wilcox's chapter begins on page 139.

Copyright
Michiru Nagatsu, Attilia Ruzzene, and Nathaniel T. Wilcox

This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_pubs/245

Commentary: Reflections on Decision Research
and Its Empiricism: Four Comments
Inspired by Harrison
Nathaniel T. Wilcox

Generally I find Harrison's chapter cogent, interesting, and well-informed in details
and particulars, and so do not speak of them. Instead, I reflect on four larger matters
Harrison brings to my mind. These four matters are presented below as four separate
sections, to be read as four separate and short comments (though the four sections do
share a few threads).

1. Intuitions of Theorists
"In some cases simple, 'agnostic' statistical modeling is appropriate, since the experiment
'does the work of theory' for the analyst, by controlling for treatments and potential
confounds:' says Harrison in his introduction. In their manifesto of Bayesian statistics,
Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963) put it in this famously entertaining way:
It has been called the interocular traumatic test; you know what the data mean
when the conclusion hits you between the eyes. The interocular traumatic test is
simple, commands general agreement, and is often applicable; well-conducted
experiments often come out that way. (217)
Later Edwards, Lindman, and Savage add that, "The rule was somewhat overstated
by a physicist who said, 'As long as it takes statistics to find out, I prefer to investigate
something else (240);"' and Ernest Rutherford allegedly said, "If your experiment
needs statistics, you ought to do a better experiment:' These are also the sentiments of
many (perhaps most) decision researchers. I find these sentiments deeply interesting
and in some respects puzzling.
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What is the source of those sentiments? Consider these two quotes.
I am about to build up a highly idealized theory of the behavior of a "rational"
person ... when certain maxims are presented ... you must ask yourself ... how
you would react if you noticed yourself violating them. (Savage 1954/1972; 7)
The following was offered by L. J. Savage as a criticism ... Suppose that a boy
must select between having a pony x and a bicycle y and that he wavers indecisively
between them [the thought experiment is further developed to a telling outcome J
... If this can happen-and the introspections of several people suggest that it
can-then the strong binary model is too strong to describe these preferences.
(Luce and Suppes 1965)
Theorists may sometimes use their own intuitions (or introspections) as inspiration
for those "maxims" Savage alludes to above (today we generally call such maxims
"axioms"). But I am not a theorist and so hesitate to speak on that matter of private
inspiration: Instead, I am interested here in the persuasive role played by shared
intuitions. In their writings, decision theorists reveal that intuitions play two strong
roles among the theorists. Axioms are the foundation of any formal decision theory,
and particularly in the case of a normative theory, a theorist frequently appeals to
another theorist's intuition, as Savage does in the first quote above. A theorist will
frequently state axioms in two ways: Once mathematically (for formal proofs)
and once verbally to aid and persuade other theorists' intuitions (concerning the
normative status, and/or the likely descriptive validity, of a proposed axiom). Second,
when a theorist suggests an outcome of her thought experiment and that suggested
outcome is widely endorsed by other theorists' intuitions, that consensus of intuitions
becomes convincing evidence concerning some theory, as Luce and Suppes admit in
the second quote above. Most frequently, such evidence from thought experiments
is negative, suggesting a counter-example that casts doubt on the descriptive
adequacy of some theory. The thought experiments are generally presented simply
and transparently-largely in verbal form, perhaps with a table or two illustrating
concrete sets of alternatives, but almost never more formally than that (Debreu 1960
being a notable exception). The purpose is to aid and persuade the reader's intuition
that the thought experiment indeed leads to outcomes contradicting some theory. In
both these cases, a consensus of intuitions or intuition consensus is a highly prized
coin of the decision-theoretic realm.
If you are very used to persuasion by means of transparent and simple verbal
descriptions or thought experiments, you may (perhaps unfairly) devalue other less
transparent kinds of evidence. Many new inferential techniques and demonstration
methods-widely accepted among either classical or Bayesian statisticians-draw on
our newfound bounty of computational power. The inferential techniques include
simulated maximum likelihood, simulation-based Bayesian estimation, and so-called
"bootstrapping" of the sampling variability of estimates. The primary demonstration
method is Monte Carlo simulation, a well-established framework for examining
estimators' behavior in finite samples. Here I share what one theorist said about the
latter method as used in one of my own papers (Wilcox 2017):
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I am quite confident that [other scholars I respect] would not be satisfied with
simulation results for a claim that could perhaps be proved analytically. I am aware
of the fact that simulations are being extensively used, but I tend to believe that
people resort to these methods when there is no hope of obtaining an analytical
result.
Analytical results on the finite sample behavior of most nonlinear estimators are only
rarely forthcoming, and only in very simple circumstances.
For whatever reasons, simulations (computation-based existence demonstrations)
are a kind of evidence contemporary theorists do not find compelling. I suspect this is
because simulations don't lend themselves to intuition consensus in the same way the
normative status of an axiom does, or the negative outcome of a thought experiment
does (nor is it an analytical proof-which, of course, the theorists find convincing
too). Presented with flair, a reader can usually grasp the results of a simulation with
no serious problem. However, if the inferential or demonstration process of simulation
is not part of your own methodological toolbox, the process remains a kind of black
box to you.
I fear that fairly or not, there is only one inferential technique that stands a chance
of generating intuition consensus among the theorists: It is the interocular trauma
test, which, by definition, is intuitive-"the conclusion hits you between the eyes:'
Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963) warn that "the enthusiast's interocular trauma
may be the skeptic's random error. A little arithmetic to verify the extent of the trauma
can yield great peace of mind for little cost (217):' Simulation-based inferences and
demonstrations take us well beyond "a little arithmetic:' One might say they are just
hundreds of millions of instances of "a little arithmetic'' assembled with care, but truly
such quantity has a nontransparent quality all its own.
Aside from simulation itself, Harrison's preferred style of statistics (and it is
mine too) also depends on millions of computations assembled with care: Complex,
highly nonlinear likelihood functions do11t get maximized without the considerable
computational muscle of a computer. The output will never have the same transparency
as a comparison of sample means, or the inspection of other simple sample moments.
Like Harrison (see in particular his Section 4.5), I have argued that simple sample
moments can be highly misleading to decision researchers (Wilcox 2008: 224-31;
Wilcox 2017), but the (apparent) transparency of (potentially misleading) simple
sample moments seems irresistible.

2. Estranged Siblings
Among the decision theorists, McFadden (1974, 1981) arguably had the single
largest impact on empirical social and behavioral scientists who work with naturally
occurring "field" data (as opposed to laboratory data): Such field researchers are the
overwhelming majority of empirical economists. In his Nobel Prize lecture, McFadden
(2001: 351) prominently recognized nine scholars, very much a mix of decision
theorists and econometricians:
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Nine other individuals who played a major role in channeling microeconometrics
and choice theory toward their modern forms, and had a particularly important
influence on my own work, are Zvi Griliches, L. L. Thurstone, Jacob Marschak,
Duncan Luce, Amos Tversky, Danny Kahneman, Moshe Ben-Akiva, Charles
Manski, and Kenneth Train.
During those remarkable twenty years from Savage ([1954] 1972) to McFadden
(1974), a brisk traffic of ideas traveled between the decision theorists and the
econometricians: For instance, Luce (1959) and Luce and Suppes (1965) are absolutely
central to McFadden (1974), who additionally cites Block and Marschak (1960) and
Tversky and Russo (1969).
In the decades since McFadden (1974), prominent decision theorists such as
Fishburn (1978) and Machina (1985) also turned their talents to the apparently
probabilistic nature of discrete binary choice-with no discernable impact on
econometricians. And in the decades since Manski (1975), econometricians such as
Cosslett (1983) and Horowitz (1992) turned their own talents to the same subjectwith no discernable impact on decision research. Focus now on two papers published
a quarter century ago: This gives us plenty of time to see their impact. Busemeyer and
Townsend ( 1993) is a landmark contribution to probabilistic decision theory: It offers
a very precise decision-theoretic model of both the econometric link function and
index function. It is clearly influential with 569 total SSCI (Social Science Citation
Index) citations, but gets zero citations from theoretical econometricians (though a
handful of citations from applied econometricians). Published in the same year as
Busemeyer and Townsend, most would call Klein and Spady (1993) an important
milestone in econometric theory: It can free the researcher of assumptions concerning
link functions-at the cost of strong assumptions (but short of linearity, and this was a
major contribution to semiparametric estimation) concerning index functions. It too
is clearly influential with 226 total SSCI citations, but just one (Donkers, Melenberg,
and Van Soest 2001) is a decision research paper and none are decision theory papers.
The sad truth is that over the quarter century since 1993, these two communities of
scholars (the decision researchers and the econometricians) share about as much as the
Dance and Physics Departments. Those remarkably cross-fertile years from 1954 to
1974 are well over: Econometrics and decision research went their very separate ways.
To see the ways they went, consider the probabilistic model Harrison specifies
for Expected Utility Theory (EUT) in eq. (4), Pr(R) =f (VEU). This is just a specific
instance of the more general model Pr (R) = F(D(R, S j 0) ), where Fis any link function
and D(R,S I0) is any theoretical representation of the comparison between lotteries
R and S-to the econometrician, the index function with parameters 0. It's fair to say
many econometricians are perfectly happy to require linearity (in the parameters 0) of
D(R,S I 0): They just want to estimate 0 without assumptions concerning F, the link
function. From the viewpoint of decision theory, making D(R,S j 0) a linear function
of 0 essentially takes the Prince of Denmark out of Hamlet: A representation without
nonlinear entities in D(R,S I 0) just isn't worth discussing or thinking about. It's fair
to say the decision researchers (Harrison and I, and at least some theorists such as
Busemeyer and Townsend 1993) are fine with specific assumptions about F, if it buys
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us the ability to estimate the nonlinear entities in D(R, S j 0) with few extra assumptions.
So decision researchers and econometricians have found themselves at cross-purposes
since the days of McFadden and Manski.

3. All the Horses Are Dead, Long Live the Horse Race
A decision theory 1: is (usually) an axiom set such as Ar= {At,A{, ... ,A;} generating
a representation (such as BUT) that applies to some prespecified set Q of lottery
pairs {R,S}. There are two empirical strategies as regards skepticism concerning such
theories. The more common strategy takes a narrow focus on one or another of the
axioms in Ar, over some subset E c 0: Here E is a special slice of .Q, for instance, a
"common ratio group" of lottery pairs in some experiment designed to interrogate At
(e.g., the Independence Axiom of BUT). Generally Q is an infinite set, so that special
slice E is a very small fraction of .Q. When this empirical strategy rejects axiom At on
subset E, we do learn something important and especially useful to decision theorists
in the here and now: They may now craft a replacement for At, hopefully leading to an
improved theory.
But we need to keep clear that we learned little about the theory's performance
on the set Q - B. We might be better off with a different sort of experiment: some
kind of broad sampling of .Q instead of a specially contrived slice of .Q, and then a
contest between the theories themselves rather than specific axioms. This less common
empirical strategy (practiced by Harrison, myself and others such as Hey and Orme
1994) interrogates the collective wisdom of whole axiom sets Ar by means of horse races
between their representations-generally speaking with a rather less special slice of .Q
as the experimental pairs. My firm conviction is that every descriptive decision theory
is a dead horse walking-if we insist on its slaughter should it fail to describe every
preference over all pairs in .Q for every decision maker. It is much more reasonable
to race the horses (the theories, in competition with one another) and ask which
ones win a noticeable fraction of the races (in other words, best explain the behavior
of a noticeable fraction of our subjects on broad collections of decision problems).
Harrison has this in mind when he discusses mixture models.
From both economic and evolutionary game theory we have good reason to expect
living populations are mixtures of types (today this is well known to the point of
banality). This is a primary reason (among others) why the "hypothetico-deductive''
science model has limited usefulness for the empiricism of the biological and social
sciences. I congratulate physicists for their clever selection of (mostly) the easiest
possible populations (homogeneous ones) to work with, but someone has to meet the
theoretical and empirical challenges of mixed populations with deep and pervasive
heterogeneity. Given those types of populations, simple hypothesis-testing is potentially
counterproductive. Suppose theory 1:'s axiom
survives a narrow hypothesis test
in set B for (say) 70 percent of subjects. But also suppose that in a competitive tests
against (say) two other theories, on a broad sample of set .Q, theory 1: best accounts for
the behavior of just 20 percent of the subjects. I have little hesitation saying that the
former test of axiom
is at best a distraction and at worst highly misleading. When
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we concentrate on relative success rather than absolute null hypothesis-testing, we're
in a different world of measures of predictive success such as likelihoods, information
criteria, estimated type shares in the population, and so forth. It is not a world of simple
sample moments and interocular traumas.

4. Do as Theorists Say (Not as Empiricists Do)
"It cannot be said ... that a rational man must behave according to the Bernoulli

principle;' Allais (1953: 505) concluded in the English Summary of his celebrated

Econometrica article (in French). As Ellsberg (1961: 646) could have put the argument
on Allais' behalf, "One could emphasize here ... that the postulates ... faHed to predict
reflective choices'.' Yet listen in today among the conferees at any decision research
conference: Most regard "the Bernoulli principle" as definitive of rational decisionmaking under uncertainty and, in this and many other ways, we are all Savage's ([1954]
1972) children. To us, "Allais' Paradox" is a finding that subjects' decision behavior
violates Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT) and is therefore not rational (pace
Allais and Ellsberg). As Harrison mentions, SEUT has other prominent normative
Discontents (Loomes and Sugden 1982; Machina 1982; Schmeidler 1989; Epstein
1992)-Allais and Ellsberg are just the two most familiar names. But if pressed I think
a majority of the conferees would agree that SEUT is rational choice under uncertainty.
Savage has other children: Bayesian statisticians (Box and Tiao 1973; Gelman
et al. 2004), Bayesian econometricians (Zellner 1971; Geweke 2005), and Bayesian
psychometricians (Kruschke 2011; Lee and Wagenmakers 2014). Edwards, Lindman,
and Savage (1963) published perhaps the first manifesto of Bayesian statistics,
contrasting "such procedures as a Bayesian would employ in an article submitted to
the Journal of Experimental Psychology, say, and those [classical procedures] now
typically found in that journal (195);" and in concluding said, "Bayesian procedures
are not merely another tool for the working scientist ... as we saw, evidence that
leads to classical rejection of the null hypothesis will often leave a Bayesian more
confident of that same null hypothesis than he was to start with (240):' They squarely
address the statistical practices of researchers and ofter the new Bayesian alternative
to those researchers' classical data analysis. They are not talking about modeling
subject behavior. Yet most citations of the manifesto borrow its mathematical results
as descriptive models of subject behavior-to be followed, with high likelihood, by
classical hypothesis-testing using the experiment's data. Uncharitable people might say
normative hypocrisy has been perfected in decision research: Scholars born of Savage's
seismic advance ask why subjects don't do as theorists say (not as empiricists do). Just
a half dozen years ago Matthews (2011: 843) could fairly say "Judgment and decision
making research overwhelmingly uses null hypothesis significance testing as the basis
for statistical inference" and ask "What might judgment and decision making research
be like if we took a Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing?"
Harrison argues (I think fairly) that decision research does its classical statistics
with sometimes questionable rigor. But why would decision researchers do classical
statistics at all, if we really believe that obedience to SEUT and Bayes' Rule is rationality

.f
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in the face of uncertainty? This question is wholly unoriginal: From conversations,
I know it nags many other classical empirical economists. But in decision research,
perhaps this question ought to elicit particularly sheepish grins? Or should we take our
cues from Emerson and Whitman-not insisting on foolish consistency, and accepting
that we contain multitudes? These are matters best addressed by philosophers,
historians, and methodologists.
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